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The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers:
The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment
JAMES A. McKENNA*
For nearly a century courts have attempted to define the constitutional
limitations on the governmental power to obtain an individual's private
papers.' At issue has been the scope of protection afforded to such papers by
*B.A. 1974, University of Dayton; J.D. 1977, Northwestern University. Associate, Jenner &
Block, Chicago, Ill.
'Although a precise definition of "private papers" is impossible, standards are not
altogether lacking. Those papers having a close relationship to an individual's personality,
especially to the private aspects of personality, are clearly "private." See Note, Formalism, Legal
Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90
HARV. L. REv. 945, 988 (1977) (hereinafter cited as HARvARD Note]. Thus, personal letters and
diaries fall within this conception, see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 427 (1976) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Comment, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Considera-
tions, 6 LoY. L.A.L. Rev. 274, 302-03 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LOYoLA Comment]; Com-
ment, Papers, Privacy and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: A Constitutional Analysis, 69 Nw.
U.L. REV. 626, 648 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NoRTHWETsM Comment], while most business
records do not. See HARvARD Note, supra, at 988-89 (public purpose of business partnership
places partnership records outside of fourth and fifth amendment right of privacy). The business
records of a sole proprietor or practitioner, however, may have a claim to "private papers" status.
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 426-27 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (such records
"are at least an extension of an aspect of a person's activities . . ."). Examples of papers which
are clearly not "private" are those created or authenticated by the government, such as
automobile registration certificates and draft cards. See, e.g., id. at 426 (such records "hardly
reflect an extension of the person"). A substantial gray area exists for nonbusiness economic
records, such as cancelled checks and tax records. Justice Brennan, concurring in Fisher, thought
such records to be protected by the privilege because they may provide "clear insights into a per-
son's total lifestyle." 425 U.S. at 426-27.
Regardless of where the line between "private" and "nonprivate" papers is drawn, it is
clear that some papers are more private than others. In a close case, other factors may be con-
sidered by the court to determine if the papers in question are sufficiently "private." Among
these are the steps taken by the owner to insure their privacy, see Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 351 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); the extent to which the enforcement of a par-
ticular law requires the acquisition of the papers, see LoYoLA Comment, supra, at 306-07; and
the relationship of the papers to "private, individual rights or interests recognized by the Court to
be 'fundamental,' " see HARVARD Note, supra, at 988. As one commentator noted, the extent of
the privacy intrusion which accompanies the governmental acquisition of papers depends upon
more than the nature of the papers. Under this analysis, a seizure of all of an individual's
cancelled checks is quite intrusive, although the seizure of only one would not be. See
LoYoLA Comment, supra, at 302. But cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (defendant
had no fourth amendment interest in his bank records which were in the possession of a bank).
Although the governmental procurement of any type of evidence must comply with fourth
amendment requirements, the case for a higher standard of protection under a hierarchical
theory of the fourth amendment becomes more compelling for more "private" papers. For exam-
ple, this paper will propose that a more stringent standard of probable cause be required in the
issuance of search warrants where the objects of the search are private papers than where other
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the fourth2 and fifth3 amendments. Recent cases have significantly narrowed
the private papers doctrine which had once appeared nearly absolute. 4 In
Fisher v. United States, the Court upheld a governmental subpoena directing
a taxpayer to produce accountants' workpapers and other tax records, sug-
gesting in dictum that the fifth amendment no longer protects private
papers. 5 In Andresen v. Maryland, the Court held that obtaining such papers
through an otherwise valid search and seizure does not implicate the fifth
amendment whatsoever. 6
The Fisher and Andresen decisions, and their clear implications, have
framed the issue with an unprecedented certainty and urgency: the sole
source of constitutional protection for private papers now appears to be the
fourth amendment. A rigorous analysis of fourth amendment protection,
heretofore largely unnecessary, is now crucial. 7 Following an analysis of these
decisions and their effect on the fifth amendment protection of private
papers, this paper will attempt to delineate the scope of the fourth amend-
ment's protective ambit. Given the central purpose of the fourth amendment
to limit governmental invasions of privacy," and the uniquely private nature
of private papers, a more stringent standard of protection should be accorded
to such papers. Such a hierarchical view of the fourth amendment is well
established in other contexts, and its extension to private papers is fully
justified. 9
PRELUDE: THE Boyd DECISION
The watershed for any study of private papers and the Constitution is the
1886 opinion of the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States,'0 a decision
types of evidence are sought. See notes 90-102 infra & text accompanying. Obviously, the less
"private" are the papers involved, the less cogent such a contention becomes.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3The portion of the fifth amendment relevant to private papers is the self-incrimination
clause: "nor shall any person ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witnbss against
himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.4See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463
(1976).
425 U.S. 391, 409-13 (1976). See notes 44-54 infra & text accompanying.
6427 U.S. 463, 473-74, 477 (1976).
7The commentary regarding the constitutional protection of private papers has been
dominated by fifth amendment analysis. This continues to be the case even in the wake of Fisher
and Andresen. See, e.g., Comment, A Paper Chase: The Search and Seizure of Personal Business
Records, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 489 (1977).
8See notes 57-69 infra & text accompanying.
9See notes 61-82, 90-103, 113-116 infra & text accompanying.
10116 U.S. 616 (1886). At issue in Boyd was the constitutional validity of a court order
directing the defendants in a federal forfeiture proceeding to produce a business invoice for
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characterized both as "among the greatest constitutional decisions of this
Court"," and as sowing "the seeds of a dangerous heresy."' 2 The trial court
ordered the production of an invoice pursuant to its authority under an 1874
statute."3 Confronted with this statute and the specific court order issued
under its authority, the Boyd Court declared both unconstitutional, reversed
the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the compulsory
production of the invoice violated both the fourth and fifth amendments.
1 4
Interpreting broadly the phrase "search and seizure" in the fourth amend-
ment, the Court employed a test of characterization based on the functional
equivalence of compulsory production and search and seizure. The character-
istics of an actual search and seizure-the "forcible entry into a man's house
and searching amongst his papers"-were deemed merely "aggravating in-
cidents" the absence of which was insufficient to exclude fourth amendment
considerations.I s The Court also looked beyond form to articulate an expan-
sive view of the fifth amendment's constitutional protection, holding that the
twenty-nine cases of plate glass previously imported into the country. The government had charged
the defendants with importing an additional quantity of glass in violation of the revenue laws,
and it was necessary to establish the existence and circumstances of the previous importation. For
this purpose the court directed production of the invoice. The defendants complied under protest
and the jury found for the government. Id. at 618.
"Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 776 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
'28 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2264, at 367 (3d ed. 1940).
13Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, 18 Stat. 186 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 535 (1970)). Section
5 of the Act allowed the government, in a non-criminal revenue proceeding, to move for the pro-
duction of any record of the defendant which would "tend to prove any allegation made by the
United States." Moreover, if the motion for production were granted, the defendant's failure to
comply would result in the government's allegations being taken as confessed.
In fairness to the constitutional sensitivity of the act's drafters, it should be noted that the
statute contained two provisions somewhat alleviating its otherwise draconian nature. First, the
record sought to be produced had to be particularly described; second, the "confession of
judgment" effect in the event of a failure to comply with the order was not automatic if the
failure could "be explained to the satisfaction of the court."
"Over and above Boyd's landmark status in the area of private papers, the decision's addi-
tional significance lies in its novel result. The court ordered a new trial, holding that the admis-
sion into evidence of the invoice was erroneous and unconstitutional. Boyd in effect, therefore,
applied a constitutional exclusionary rule twenty-eight years before the rule was expressly man-
dated for federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 62-66 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LANDYNSKI].
In addition to its holding, the Boyd decision is significant for the mode of constitutional in-
terpretation it employed and advocated. "A close and literal construction" of constitutional pro-
tections, warned the Court, "deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual deprecia-
tion of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance." 116 U.S. at 635. The
modern interpretation of fourth and fifth amendment protection of private papers has indeed
become "close and literal," to the point of the nearly total erosion of Boyd. See generally HAR.
vAlD Note, supra note 1.
11116 U.S. at 622. The Court summarized its initial holding:
It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man's private papers to
establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope
of the fourth amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and seizure
would be; because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose
of search and seizure.
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forfeiture action, although technically a civil proceeding, was "in substance
and effect a criminal one.
s16
Having thus resolved the issue of applicability, the issue composing the
bulk of the Court's opinion was whether the compulsory production of the in-
voice constituted an unreasonable search and seizure violative of the fourth
amendment. The Court's affirmative answer to this question rested on two
bases. First, the Court employed a property interest test that limited the types
of property seizable-differentiated from the manner in which property is
seized-to those in which the government has a possessory interest.
1 7
Although this rationale, under the Boyd Court's analysis, was independently
sufficient to find a fourth amendment violation, the Court supplied a second
basis for the decision which gave consideration to the incriminating nature of
the invoice. On this point, Boyd's holding is clear. Because the fourth and
fifth amendments "run almost into each other,"18 the compulsory self-
incrimination of an individual through governmental acquisition of private
papers constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the
fourth amendment.19
161d. at 634. Boyd's application of the fifth amendment privilege, by its terms applicable only
"in any criminal case," to a technically noncriminal proceeding was merely the beginning of an
expansive doctrine. The current law has gone much further: "the availability of the privilege does
not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of
the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49
(1967). Fifth amendment protection thus depends upon the possible use to which the self-
incriminating evidence may be put, rather than the nature of the proceeding for which it is pro-
cured. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
"Illustrating this principle is the Court's explanation of why stolen goods and contraband
could be lawfully seized while private books and papers could not: "[I]n the one case, the govern-
ment is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not." 116 U.S. at 623.
111d. at 630.
"
5 To support this reasoning the Court looked to the historical context of the fourth amend-
ment. Much of this discussion concerned the past abuses conducted pursuant to general search
warrants and writs of assistance and the historical importance of property concepts in determin-
ing the legality of searches. In addition, however, the Court quoted language from the landmark
English case of Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765) reprinted in 19 How. St.
Trials 1029 (1816), in which a publisher recovered damages for the search and seizure of his
private papers, to the effect that a search for evidence is not allowed because it is within the
principle prohibiting the state from "compelling self-accusation" from an individual. 116 U.S. at
629. Later in the opinion, the Court summarized this newly-born doctrine:
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments. They
throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" con-
demned in the fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compell-
ing a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in
the fifth amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself," which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light on the
question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different
from compelling him to be a witness against himself. We think it is within the clear in-
tent and meaning of those terms.
116 U.S. at 633.
PRIVATE PAPERS
In contrast to its fourth amendment analysis, the Boyd Court's discussion
of the fifth amendment was rather perfunctory. The Court held that any
compulsory production of private books and papers in a "criminal" setting
was "contrary to the principles of a free government" and incapable of surviv-
ing "the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom." 20 On this
basis, the court-ordered production of the invoice compelled each defendant
"to be a witness against himself' within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment.
21
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND PRIVATE PAPERS
Search and Seizure and the Fifth Amendment:
The End of the Road
When private papers are seized by governmental agents rather than pro-
duced in response to a subpoena, the threshold question to determine fifth
amendment applicability is whether the seizure compels one to be a witness
against himself. 22 In Boyd the Court held that for purposes of the fourth
amendment, although not technically a search and seizure, a compulsory pro-
duction of papers had the same purpose as a search and seizure and was
therefore within the protection of the fourth amendment. 23 It is not wholly il-
logical to conclude the converse, that the procurement of papers through a
search and seizure is constitutionally equivalent to their compulsory produc-
tion through a subpoena for purposes of the fifth amendment. In 1921 the
Supreme Court accepted this proposition24 but it was not until 1966 in
Schmerber v. California that the Court first dealt with whether fifth amend-
ment compulsion is present in the context of a search and seizure. 25 There
20116 U.S. at 631-32.
'Id. at 634-35.221n holding that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated by
the court order directing production of the defendants' invoice, the Court in Boyd failed to pro-
vide a reasoned basis for the position, merely stating in conclusory fashion that such compulsory
production of private papers was "contrary to the principles of a free government." 116 U.S. at
632. Earlier in the opinion, in discussing both the fourth and fifth amendments, the Court had
suggested another rationale: protection against governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life." Id. at 630. These policies of the self-incrimination privilege,
however readily stated, have been forced to yield to an increasingly literal interpretation of the
fifth amendment. To invoke the Privilege, the compulsory production or seizure of private papers
must compel an individual "to be a witness against himself": the fifth amendment cannot be cut
"completely loose from the moorings of its language." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401
(1976).
23Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).t
'Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921). The Court's analysis of the applicabili-
ty of the fifth amendment to search and seizure consisted of one paragraph.
25384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the defendant was hospitalized following an
automobile accident which he was suspected of having caused by driving while intoxicated. A
police officer placed Schmerber under arrest and directed a physician to take a blood sample
from him. The defendant, on the advice of counsel, refused to consent to the procedure. One of
1977-1978]
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appears to be no principled distinction between the finding of fifth amend-
ment compulsion in Schmerber and in a search and seizure of private papers
since in both cases the individual is "compelled . . . to submit to an attempt
to discover evidence that might be used to prosecute him" through the
governmental power of search and seizure. 26 Although lower federal courts
had been divided on the issues of whether the seizure of private papers im-
plicated the fifth amendment, 27 the Supreme Court appears to have decided
the question. In Andresen v. Maryland, the Court held that the seizure of
documents from the defendant's offices and their admission in evidence did
not violate the fifth amendment because the required compulsion was not
present in a situation involving search and seizure.2 8 The clear import of this
the issues before the Court was whether the withdrawal of blood and the admission in evidence of
the blood analysis report violated Schmerber's privilege against self-incrimination. The Court
analyzed this issue in a two-step procedure, asking (1) whether there was "compulsion" within the
meaning of the fifth amendment, and (2) if so, whether this procedure compelled the defendant
"to be a witness against himself." Id at 761. The significance of Schmerber for the present
discussion lies in the fact that the Court clearly held that a search and seizure (the extraction of
blood) can constitute "compulsion" so as to make applicable the fifth amendment self-
incrimination privilege. In the words of the Court:
It could not be denied that in requiring petitioner to submit to the withdrawal and
chemical analysis of his blood the State compelled him to submit to an attempt to
discover evidence that might be used to prosecute him for a criminal offense. He sub-
mitted only after the police officer rejected his objection and directed the physician to
proceed. The officer's direction to the physician to administer the test over peti-
tioner's objection constituted compulsion for the purposes of the pritdlege.
Id. at 761 (emphasis supplied).
26See HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 974 n.176. It may be argued that the intrusion involved
in Schmerber was much greater than that involved in a routine search for papers. Although the
degree of intrusiveness of a given search and seizure is relevant to the determination of
reasonableness under the fourth amendment, see notes 90-103, 113-116, 142-147 infra & text ac-
companying, it does not go to the question of fifth amendment compulsion. See Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 333 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the Fifth Amendment does not
distinguish among types or degrees of compulsion"). A homeowner is no more free to prevent a
search of his papers than was Mr. Schmerber free to forbid the seizure of his blood. See An-
dresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 486-87 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The fact that non-
physical custodial interrogation of an accused is less "intrusive" than interrogation employing
"third degree" tactics does not preclude a finding of compulsion in the former instance. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"For the two leading cases, compare Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971), with United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 984 (1971). For extended treatments of the lower court case law, see LOYOLA Comment,
supra note 1; NORTHWESTERN Comment, supra.note 1.
20427 U.S. 463 (1976). The Court's interpretation of the compulsion requirement was exac-
tingly narrow:
[P]etitioner was not asked to say or to do anything. The records seized contained
statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing. The search for and
seizure of these records were conducted by law enforcement personnel. Finally, when
these records were introduced at trial, they were authenticated by a handwriting ex-
pert, not by petitioner. Any compulsion of petitioner to speak, other than the inherent
psychological pressure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence, was not present.
Id. at 473.
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analysis is that the self-incrimination privilege is unavailable in situations
where papers are obtained through governmental search and seizure.2 9
The principal shortcoming of Andresen is its failure to consider the
holding in Schmerber that a search and seizure can constitute compulsion
sufficient to support a fifth amendment claim.30 The self-incrimination claim
in Schmerber was rejected because the blood test evidence was held to be
merely "physical" evidence and not "communicative" or "testimonial" in
nature.3' Had the evidence in Schmerber been testimonial, as that in An-
dresen concededly was, a fifth amendment violation would have occurred and
the Andersen Court would have been unable to avoid even mentioning it. To-
day, however, the results in each case are perfectly compatible despite ra-
tionales that squarely conflict. The underlying basis for this conflict, and for
that between the Andresen majority and dissent, goes to a difference in the
mode of constitutional interpretation employed by each side. The Andresen
21The Andresen Court's process of reasoning is perhaps as significant as the holding it
reached. The Court's decision, although justifiable, see Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomor-
row: The Case For Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 701-03 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Friendly], is characterized by misuse of precedent and misleading argumentation. After noting
that the records seized were incriminating and that at least some contained statements made by
the defendant, 427 U.S. at 471, and thus arguably within the protection of the fifth amendment,
the Court cited two cases-Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), and Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973)-for the proposition that the compulsion required by the fifth
amendment must operate directly on the accused. Both cases, however, involved situations where
the legal process was directed to a person other than the accused for records not in the possession
of the accused. Couch, in fact, emphasized that fifth amendment protection of papers had usual-
ly been limited to "instances where possession and ownership conjoined." 409 U.S. at 330. An-
dresen is thus easily distinguishable, for the search warrants in that case were directed to the
defendant's personal offices and sought records clearly within the defendant's possession. The An-
dresen Court then attempted to distinguish earlier cases in which a search and seizure did give
rise to a fifth amendment violation. In those cases, according to the Court, the" search and
seizure also violated the fourth amendment, and it was this unlawfulness which supplied the ele-
ment of compulsion and served as the "legal predicate" for the fifth amendment violation. 427
U.S. at 472. As a matter of law and logic, however, the Court is plainly wrong. It was never held
that fourth amendment illegality was required to sustain a fifth amendment claim: the fourth
amendment violation in earlier cases was merely coincidental, not "predicate." Id. at 489 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Moreover, there is no logical reason why the legality of the search should
determine the presence of fifth amendment compulsion, for the effect on the accused is identical
in either case. The distinction drawn by the Court would render the fifth amendment applicable
only in situations where its protection is unnecessary.
3384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). See note 25 supra. The holding of Andresen is directly op-
posite: fifth amendment compulsion is nonexistent in the context of a search and seizure. 427
U.S. at 473-74. It could be argued that in Schmerber there was some level of cooperation by the
defendant not present in Andresen. However, an interpretation of compulsion which depends
upon the necessity of a search victim's cooperation is neither logical nor practical. Under this
theory, compulsion would have been lacking in Schmerber had the defendant been unconscious
and would have been present in Andresen had it been necessary for the defendant to open a safe
or unlock a file cabinet.
11384 U.S. at 765. The Court stated: "Since the blood test evidence, although an in-
criminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to
some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on [fifth amend-
ment] privilege grounds." Id.
1977-1978]
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majority employed an ordinary meaning analysis of "compulsion"-because
the defendant "was not asked to say or do anything," how could he be said to
have been "compelled" for purposes of self-incrimination? 2 Justice Brennan
urged in dissent that the issue not be resolved through the use of a "simplistic
notion of compulsion.""s In this way, Brennan's opinion, and his mode of
constitutional interpretation, hark back to the Court's opinion in the Boyd
case where a "close and-literal construction" of constitutional protections was
eschewed.34 It was this mode of interpretation that the Andresen Court
declined to follow.35
Compulsory Process and the Fifth Amendment:
The Fisher Decision
Until recently, it had been firmly established that the fifth amendment
privilege may excuse an individual from compliance with a subpoena direc-
ting him to produce personal papers. 3" With the decision in Fisher v. United
States,"7 however, the analytic basis of the principle has been severely, if not
totally, undermined, to the point where it may no longer be viable. In Fisher,
the IRS served summonses on attorneys, ordering them to produce certain
documents, primarily accountants' workpapers.as In the proceedings to en-
force the summonses, the issues were two-fold: Were the taxpayers protected
from the summonses directed to the attorneys by (1) the fifth amendment, or
(2) the attorney-client privilege?
31427 U.S. at 473.
11427 U.S. at 486. For Brennan, compulsion was clearly present: "Search and seizure is as
rife with elements of compulsion as subpoena. The intrusion occurs under the lawful process of
the State. The individual is not free to resist that authority." Id. at 486-87.34Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). See note 14 supra.
"SFor a general discussion of the fifth amendment compulsion issue, detailing the "close and
literal construction" given to the self-incrimination privilege in Andresen and other recent cases,
see Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61
MINN. L. REv. 383 (1977).3SBoyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Dean Wigrore, who was extremely critical of
the fourth amendment basis of Boyd, accepted the fifth amendment holding of the case, stating
that the availability of the privilege to subpoenas directing the production of incriminating
documents was "universally conceded." 8 J. WIcMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2264, at 363 (3d ed. 1940).
See C. MCCORMICK HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 126 (2d ed. E. Cleary, 1972); Com-
ment, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments-Dimensions of an "Intimate Relationship," 13
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 857, 868 (1966). Moreover, the proposition has been continually affirmed by
the Supreme Court in dicta, invariably with a citation to Boyd. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1974), where the Court stated: "The privilege applies to the business records
of the sole proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to personal documents containing more in-
timate information about the individual's private life."
-1425 U.S. 391 (1976).
"
8Id. at 394. Prior to the issuance of the summonses, IRS agents had interviewed two tax-
payers concerning possible tax liability on their parts. Shortly after the interviews, the taxpayers
obtained from their accountants documents relating to their tax return preparation and then
transferred them to attorneys they had retained to assist them in connection with the investiga-
tion.
[Vol. 53:55
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The Court easily disposed of the first question, holding that the enforce-
ment of the summons against the attorneys would not violate the fifth amend-
ment because the necessary element of compulsion was absent.3 9 Against the
argument that the privilege should not be lost simply because of the transfer
to an attorney to obtain legal advice, the Court reiterated its commitment to
a narrow interpretation of the compulsion requirement by emphasizing the
strictly personal nature of the privilege. 40 Thus, its conclusion was reached
through the following progression: no possession, no compulsion, no fifth
amendment privilege. This analysis would be unavailable, however, if the
taxpayers were in actual possession of the papers. Because the Court held that
if a client is privileged under the fifth amendment from producing papers in
his possession, the attorney invoking the attorney-client privilege may also
refuse to comply with a subpoena for their production if the papers were
transferred to him for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, 41 the Court was
forced to consider whether compulsion would occur if the taxpayer had
possession of the papers. Having established this analytical framework, 42 the
Court crystallized the issue "to the question of what, if any, incriminating
testimony within the fifth amendment's protection, is compelled by a
documentary summons. ' 43 The potential sources of compelled testimony are
""The taxpayer's privilege under this Amendment is not violated by enforcement of the
summonses involved in these cases because enforcement against a taxpayer's lawyer would not
'compel' the taxpayer to do anything-and certainly would not compel him to be a 'witness'
against himself." Id. at 397.
"One factor necessary for a finding of compulsion is that the person asserting the privilege
be in possession, actual or constructive, of the paper involved. Mere ownership is insufficient, as
demonstrated by Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). Couch involved an Internal
Revenue Service summons in connection with a tax investigation of the petitioner, a sole pro-
prietor of a restaurant. The issue presented was whether Ms. Couch could invoke the self-
incrimination privilege to prevent the production of her records in the possession of her accoun-
tant. Stating that the privilege is a personal one, the Court held that because the summons was
directed only to the accountant, "the ingredient of personal compulsion against an accused is
lacking." Id. at 329. Later in the opinion, the Court noted the possibility of "constructive posses-
sion" in cases where the relinquishment of actual possession was very temporary and insignificant.
Such constructive possession would be sufficient to support a finding of fifth amendment compul-
sion. Id. at 333.
:1425 U.S. at 404-05.
2 The legal matrix which the Fisher Court has established at this point in the opinion can
be summarized in the following manner. If A has no fifth amendment privilege with respect to
certain papers, a transfer of them to his attorney, B, will give B no privilege against their com-
pulsory production. 425 U.S. at 403-04. If on the other hand A is privileged, under the fifth
amendment, from producing the papers and transfers them to B to obtain legal advice, B will
also be privileged from producing them. The source of B's privilege, however, is not the fifth
amendment- that was the first holding in Fisher-but the attorney-client privilege.
43425 U.S. at 409. The Court began its analysis with an extended discussion of the Boyd
decision, and thus appeared ready to confront that case directly and perhaps to reconsider it.
Much of Boyd, the Court noted, had not "stood the test of time." Id. at 407. The chief limita-
tion on Boyd's expansive interpretation of the fifth amendment, according to the Court, was the
development of the principle that the self-incrimination privilege does not "proscribe the com-
pelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence." Rather, the fifth amendment "applies
only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating."
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two-fold: the testimonial compulsion may be found in the act of complying
with the subpoena or in the contents of the papers themselves.
At the outset, the Fisher Court recognized that the compulsory produc-
tion of evidence "has communicative aspects of its own." By complying with a
subpoena, the party producing the evidence tacitly communicates that the
papers demanded do exist in his possession or control and that he believes the
papers produced are those demanded. 44 As to the existence of the papers and
their possession by an individual, the Court found it "doubtful" that implicit-
ly admitting these facts "rises to the level of testimony within the protection
of the fifth amendment,1 45 because the existence and location of the papers
are a "foregone conclusion." Tacitly conceding their existence and possession
therefore is not "testimony" since the tacit concession does not tell the govern-
ment anything it does not know already.4 6
Id. at 408. To the extent that Boyd stood for a broader interpretation of the fifth amendment,
the Court characterized the decision as "a rule searching for a rationale." Id. at 409.
4"Id. at 410.
41Id. at 411. Alternatively, the Court held that neither the existence nor location of the
papers "poses any realistic threat of incrimination of the taxpayer," even assuming production
had some "minimal testimonial significance." Id. at 412.
"The reach of this analysis is unclear, because it is not difficult to conceive of situations
where the existence of papers is not a "foregone conclusion." In such a situation, would produc-
tion of the papers then be sufficiently testimonial to invoke the fifth amendment? Justice Mar-
shall, concurring in Fisher, thought so and contended that the majority's theory would "afford
almost complete protection against compulsory production of our most private papers." 425 U.S.
at 432. There are at least three reasons, however, gravitating against this interpretation of the
Court's opinion. First, the majority's suggestion that compulsory production of items may involve
a testimonial concession as to their existence is a truly novel one, as Marshall himself recognized.
Id. at 430. The traditional rationale for holding that compliance with a subpoena constitutes
testimonial communication is the notion of "implicit authentication." See id. at 412 n.12 and
authorities cited therein. It seems more likely that, having arguably undermined any content-
oriented fifth amendment basis for the protection of private papers, see notes 50-54 infra & ac-
companying text, the Court was merely being thorough in disposing of all potential fifth amend-
ment issues rather than fashioning a broad new rule for invoking the self-incrimination privilege.
Such was the interpretation of Justice Brennan, who viewed the Court's opinion as making severe
if not total inroads on the fifth amendment privilege for private papers. The probable result of
Fisher, he thought, was that "once again the Court is laying the groundwork for future decisions
that will tell us that the question here formally reserved was actually answered against the
availability of the privilege." 425 U.S. at 415 (concurring opinion).
Second, the analysis suggested by the Court, in addition to being novel, is also of broad ap-
plicability. The analysis would extend beyond private papers to cover all types of evidence, id. at
430 n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring), and it is doubtful that the Court intended its opinion to so
expand the fifth amendment.
Finally, Marshall's interpretation of the Court's language would restrict the scope of the
subpoena power much more than courts in recent years have shown any inclination to do. By
allowing a fifth amendment defense to the production of evidence whose existence-in the
government's knowledge-has not met some minimum level of probability, Marshall's theory
would in effect impose something akin to a "probable cause" requirement for the issuance and
enforcement of subpoena. Although this paper argues that a proper interpretation of the fourth
amendment may require a preliminary showing of some type of "reasonably probability" to
justify a subpoena directed to private papers, see notes 170-85 infra & text accompanying, it is
suggested here merely that the Fisher Court did not intend to establish such a standard under its
interpretation of the fifth amendment. Such an interpretation would constitute a major inroad
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The potential testimonial nature of the implicit indication by the party
that the papers produced are those described in the subpoena was also readily
discarded. 47 Even where the papers produced are the taxpayer's own, which
was not the situation in Fisher, the Court's rationale has provided a basis for
denying application of the fifth amendment privilege. In the same way that
implicitly admitting the existence of subpoened papers does not constitute
fifth amendment "testimony"-because the government is in no way relying
on the party's "truth-telling" to prove their existence 8-so also may the
testimonial nature of any implicit authentication be denied if the government
does not rely on the act of producing the papers to establish their authen-
ticity.49 Once again, the clear implication of the Fisher Court's rationale is
that the act of complying with a subpoena for the production of papers lacks
a sufficient testimonial character to invoke the self-incrimination privilege.
Finding that the act of producing papers in response to a subpoena does
not implicate the fifth amendment does not foreclose a successful invocation
of the privilege on the theory that the contents of the papers themselves con-
stitute self-incriminating testimony. The basis of this theory is that protection
for an individual's private thoughts should not be lost simply because they
have been reduced to writing. 50 Under this view, espoused by Justice Brennan
in his Fisher concurrence, the compulsory production of private papers is the
constitutional equivalent of compulsory extraction of private thoughts. If the
latter is within fifth amendment protection, as it undeniably is, then the
on the subpoena power, and once again one must be dubious of the likelihood of the Burger
Court espousing such a doctrinal innovation.
Moreover, it is not clear that the evidence sought in Fisher would meet such a standard.
One of the summonses sought copies of "reports and other correspondence" between the taxpayer
and the accounting firm. 425 U.S. at 394. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate a
likelihood that "other correspondence" existed or what the nature of such correspondence was. In
short, it appears that under the proper reading of Fisher, there will be few if any situations
where the implicit concession of existence and possession will constitute "testimony" for fifth
amendment purposes.
47The risk of such "implicit authentication" was lacking in this case, where the papers in-
volved were those of the accountants: "The taxpayer would be no more competent to so authen-
ticate the accountant's workpapers or reports by producing them than he would be to authen-
ticate them if testifying orally." 425 U.S. at 413. Thus, the Court was not confronted with a
situation in which an individual would be competent to authenticate the papers produced; that
is, where the papers are his own.
"Id. at 411.
4Judge Friendly, arguing against application of the fifth amendment to the production of
documents, had earlier antitipated this line of analysis. The argument that compulsory produc-
tion involves an implicit testimonial authentication, Friendly said, "reeks of the oil lamp." This
"assumed authentication" of the documents need not be present because the government "will
find its own ways for authenticating them." Friendly, supra note 29, at 702. This analysis has not
yet been applied to the compulsory production of private papers. See C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 126 at n.73 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) (allowing use of compelled
evidence without disclosing its source "seems not to have been considered as a possible means of
avoiding the self-incrimination problem").
"Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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former must also be protected.51 The logical appeal alone of this theory is, of
course, insufficient to bring private papers within the protection of the fifth
amendment. Rather, if the production of private papers is to constitute com-
pulsory self-incrimination, it must be because such production compels an in-
dividual "to be a witness against himself."5 2
The majority's response to Justice Brennan's theory is straightforward:
Because the recording of an individual's thoughts is not compelled by the
government but voluntarily undertaken by the person, the privilege does not
apply. The Court would recognize the equivalence of private thoughts and
private writings for fifth amendment purposes only to the extent that the
amendment prohibits the government from compelling an individual to
prepare the paper in the first instance53 or to respond to governmental in-
51I perceive no principle which does not permit compelling one to disclose the con-
tents of one's mind but does permit compelling the disclosure of the contents of that
scrap of paper by compelling its production. Under a contrary view, the constitutional
protection would turn on fortuity, and persons would, at their peril, record their
thoughts and the events of their lives. The ability to think private thoughts, facilitated
as it is by pen and paper, and the ability to preserve intimate memories would be cur-
tailed through fear that those thoughts or the events of those memories would become
the subjects of criminal sanctions however invalidly imposed.
Id.
52Under the language of the fifth amendment, three requirements must be present to assert
the privilege: (1) the papers sought must be incriminating; (2) the incriminating papers must
constitute testimony; and (3) the incriminating testimony must be compelled by the subpoena.
The present discussion concerns the obtaining of private papers only by subpoena and not by
search and seizure. After the holding in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), see notes
28-35 supra & text accompanying, that the seizure of private papers does not constitute compul-
sion for fifth amendment purposes, the issue of whether the contents of private papers may give
rise to testimonial self-incrimination need never be reached.
The issue of what incriminating testimony within the papers themselves, if any at all, is
compelled by a subpoena was dealt with in Fisher in a single paragraph. The incriminatory
nature of the contents of the papers was alone insufficient, for the self-incrimination privilege
"protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communica-
tions." 425 U.S. at 409. On the issue of whether the necessary testimony was present, the facts of
Fisher made the resolution simple: the workpapers involved belonged to the accountants, not the
taxpayers, and thus contained no testimonial declarations by the taxpayers seeking to invoke the
privilege. Id. Given this narrow holding, the Court had no need to consider a situation involving
a documentary subpoena for private papers; however, in dictum of far-reaching potential the
Court appeared to decide that more difficult case as well. The Court suggested that where the
original writing or making of the papers was voluntary, a subpoena directed to the papers would
not constitute testimonial compulsion as to their contents. In the words of the Court: "Further-
more, as far as this record demonstrates, the preparation of all of the papers sought in these
cases was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence,
either of the taxpayer or of anyone else." 425 U.S. at 409-10. In a footnote, the Court elaborated
on this rationale, explicitly stating that the fact that the papers were written by the person asser-
ting the fifth amendment "is insufficient to trigger the privilege... unless the Government has
compelled the subpoenaed person to write the document." The only thing compelled by a
documentary subpoena, stated the Court, is the act of producing the document. Id. at 410 n.11.
Therefore, so long as papers, no matter how private or incriminating, are not originally prepared
pursuant to government compulsion, their subsequent compulsory production does not rise to the
level of fifth amendment self-incrimination on the basis of their testimonial contents.
"
5See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). A well established exception is
the "required records" doctrine. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
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quiry in written form."' Under Brennan's view, the compulsory production of
private papers is prohibited despite the voluntariness of their creation on the
theory that the required testimony and compulsion are present in the overall
process: testimony in the contents of the papers, compulsion in their produc-
tion. In contrast, the Fisher majority interpreted the fifth amendment to re-
quire testimony and compulsion at each stage. In so bifurcating its analysis,
the Court was able to deny fifth amendment protection due to a lack of com-
pulsion at the time of creation and a lack of testimony in the act of produc-
tion.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PAPERS
A proper reading of the Andresen and Fisher decisions leads to the con-
clusion that the fifth amendment no longer protects private papers from
governmental procurement. Indeed, a recent commentary has concluded, on
the basis of these cases, that "the procedural protections of the fourth amend-
ment warrant clause have become the exclusive means of protecting personal
privacy."'55 The focus of this paper will therefore turn to a consideration of
the fourth amendment, pursuing three overlapping lines of analysis. The
starting point for analysis will be a consideration of the fourth amendment's
central purpose to protect individual privacy and the very strong privacy in-
terests inherent in private papers. Second, the procedural requirements of the
fourth amendment, and the privacy protections they provide, will be dis-
cussed. Given the fourth amendment's privacy rationale, its procedural re-
quirements should be more stringently applied where the objects of a govern-
mental search are private papers. Finally, the "reasonableness" requirement
of the fourth amendment, it will be demonstrated, retains vitality and should
not be summarily disregarded in the calculus of fourth amendment protection
of private papers.
Rationale of the Protection: Toward a Hierarchical
Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy
The fourth amendment, in its broad mandate that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated," clearly establishes
a right of privacy against certain governmental intrusions. The first major
Supreme Court articulation of this right was found in the Boyd decision.5
6
There the Court stated that the principles underlying the fourth amendment
"For example, there is no doubt that obtaining a handwritten confession from a criminal
accused would implicate the fifth amendment.
5HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 979.
ssSee notes 10-21 supra & text accompanying.
1977-1978]
INDIANA I.W JOURNAL [Vol. 53:55
apply to all governmental invasions affecting "the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life."' That the fourth amendment's virtual raison d'etre
is the protection of privacy has been resoundingly echoed by courts8 and
commentators.5 " And protection of an individual's private papers goes to the
very core of the fourth amendment right of privacy.
60
There are three considerations which support the conclusion that private
papers are central to the concerns of the fourth amendment and which sug-
gest that, in accord with the amendment's privacy rationale, private papers
should occupy a type of preferred position. The first consideration is the very
personal, private nature of such papers. This rationale has been cogently ar-
ticulated on a number of occasions. Private papers have been said to be "lit-
5 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Expanding on Boyd, Justice Brandeis,
himself no insignificant authority on the right of privacy, see Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890), expressed the fundamental purpose of the fourth amend-
ment most eloquently:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion
by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the fourth amendment.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion). The holding in
Olmstead was that wiretapping was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Brandeis, relying heavily on Boyd, refused to shackle the amendment with the majority's "unduly
literal construction." Id. at 476. The Brandeis position was ultimately vindicated in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which overruled Olmstead.
"
8See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("the principle object of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property"); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police ... is
at the core of the Fourth Amendment"). See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
s
9See, e.g., Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of
Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 A.B.F. REs. J. 1193, 1205-06 (1976) ("the framers of
the Fourth Amendment were concerned, first and foremost, with the preservation of personal
privacy"); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Ci. L. REv. 47 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Weinreb]; Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme
Court, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 212. See also Note, The Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 6 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 154 (1972).
eSee, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 529 & n.27 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Nixon case involved a challenge to the Presidential Recordings
and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1974), on a number of grounds, including the
right of privacy under the first, fourth and fifth amendments. 433 U.S. at 455-65. Although
Nixon's privacy claim was rejected, the several opinions in the case all display a substantial con-
cern for appellant's privacy interests in his personal communications. This solicitude for privacy
interests-fully consistent with the hierarchical theory of the fourth amendment advocated herein
-is somewhat surprising coming from a Court that one year previous had taken an extremely
narrow view of the privacy protections for personal papers and business records. See Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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tle more than an extension of [the owner's] person," 61 their seizure "a par-
ticularly abrasive infringement of privacy,"62 and their protection "impelled
by the moral and symbolic need to recognize and defend the private aspect of
personality.16 3 In this sense, every governmental procurement of private
papers, regardless of how it is accomplished, is uniquely intrusive. 6" In addi-
tion to the nature of the papers themselves, a second reason for according
them strict protection concerns the nature of the search for private papers.
The fundamental evil at which the fourth amendment was directed was the
sweeping, exploratory search conducted pursuant to a general warrant.65 A
search involving private papers, it has been noted, invariably partakes of a
similar generality, for "even a search for a specific, identified paper may in-
volve the same rude intrusion [of an exploratory search] if the quest for it
leads to an examination of all of a man's private papers. s66 Thus, both their
contents and the inherently intrusive nature of a search for them militates
toward the position that private papers are deserving of the fullest possible
fourth amendment protection. Finally, not only is a search involving private
papers highly intrusive in fourth amendment terms, but the nature of the
papers themselves may implicate the policies of other constitutional protec-
tions. In addition to the "intimate" relation with fifth amendment values,6
7
the obtaining of private papers by the government touches upon the first
amendment 6 and the generalized right of privacy.
69
"Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also State v.
Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 515, 213 A.2d 185, 191 (1965) ("private papers are almost inseparable
from the privacy and security of the individual").
e2ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 210.3, at 505, Commentary (1975).
e3See HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 985.
"But see Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) ("There is no special sanctity
in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render them immune from search
and seizure . . .") (dictum).
"See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 & n.9 (1967), and authorities cited therein.
See also T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969).
$'State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 515-16, 213 A.2d 185, 191 (1965). See also Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976). This argument, that a search involving private papers
is inherently intrusive due to the usual necessity of reading even wholly innocent papers, is, it
should be noted, inapplicable where documents are obtained through means of a subpoena. See
notes 171-72 infra & text accompanying.
"ySee Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 633 (1886). Until the decision in Andresen
v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), it was an open question as to whether a search and seizure of
private papers could constitute a violation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. See notes 28-35 supra & text accompanying. Because, at the very least, a seizure
of private papers implicates the policies of the fifth amendment, see 427 U.S. at 484-92 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting), it is arguable that more stringent fourth amendment protection should be
given such papers.
"Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (membership lists immune from govern-
mental procurement); Friendly, supra note 29, at 696-97, 703 (constitutional protection of per-
sonal papers, where necessary, should come from first amendment instead of fifth amendment).
"See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455-65 (1977). Cf. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). This constitutional interplay is illustrated by Stanley v.
Georgia 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In Stanley, police officers searched the defendant's home, pursuant
to a valid warrant, for evidence of gambling operations. In the course of the search, the officers
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On the basis of the foregoing analysis, private papers should be accorded
special solicitude in fourth amendment protection. This position rests on both
notions of common sense and established fourth amendment doctrine. In-
tuitively, it seems almost obvious that there should be "a marked difference
between private papers and other objects in terms of the underlying value the
fourth amendment seeks to protect; '70 moreover, this protection extends to
"papers" by the language of the fourth amendment itself. Finally, there are
few if any situations to which the "reasonable expectation of privacy" ra-
tionale of Katz v. United States71 is more appropriate than it is in the context
of private papers. 71 The major corollaries implicit in the recognition that
private papers occupy a preferred position in fourth amendment juris-
prudence are two. First, it follows that the fourth amendment must to some
extent embody a hierarchy of values and that its protection cannot be confin-
ed to all or none. 7S Second, if such a hierarchy does exist, with private papers
found three reels of film and viewed them using Stanley's own projector. Concluding the films
were obscene, the officers seized them and arrested Stanley for possession of obscene matter, for
which he was convicted. A unanimous Court reversed the conviction, with the five-man majority
holding that the state's power to regulate obscenity cannot, consistent with the first amendment,
"extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home." Id. at 568.
However, because obscenity is not protected by the first amendment, Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957), and because the material in Stanley was assumed to be obscene, 394 U.S. at 559
n.2, the Court's holding cannot rest on first amendment grounds alone; rather, the Court was
forced to recognize the "added dimension" present in Stanley-the "fundamental ... right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
privacy." 394 U.S. at 564.
Not only did the right of privacy loom large in Stanley, but so also did the fourth amend-
ment. Justice Stewart, concurring in the result, chastized the majority for "overlook[ing] the
serious inroads upon fourth amendment guarantees countenanced in this case by the Georgia
courts." 394 U.S. at 569. Although the search warrant was clearly valid, it did not authorize the
seizure of films. Moreover, Stewart could not justify the seizure under the "plain view" doctrine,
which permits the seizure of evidence discovered in the course of an otherwise valid search, sub-
ject to certain limitations. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71 (1971). See
generally J. HADDAD, ARREsT, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 10.1-10.32 (Ill. Inst. for CLE 1976). This
conclusion rested solely on the ground that "the contents of the films could not be determined by
mere inspection," 394 U.S. at 571-had heroin or other contraband been involved, the "plain
view" doctrine would have justified the seizure. Because the contents were ascertainable only after
a fifty minute exhibition, according to Stewart, the search was fatally general. Id. at 571-72.
Thus, from the two major opinions in Stanley emerged two potentially significant rationales:
first, the right of privacy in "a person's own home" salvaged an otherwise losing first amendment
claim; second, the content of criminal evidence, through its effect on the manner of the search,
rendered the search and seizure unreasonable.
"State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 515, 213 A.2d 185, 191 (1965).
71389 U.S. 347 (1967). The actual phrase, "reasonable expectation of privacy," comes from
the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan. See id. at 360.
72Cf Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-59, 465 (1977).
"Professor Amsterdam, for example, suggests that fourth amendment restraints upon sear-
ches and seizures may well be graduated, at least in theory, "in proportion to their intrusiveness
and to the sanctity of the interests they invade." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REv, 349, 390 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam]. This analysis is dealt
with in greater detail in connection with the fourth amendment procedural requirements of pro-
bable cause and specificity. See notes 86-127 infra & text accompanying.
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near the top, it must follow that fourth amendment protection is to some ex-
tent based on the content of the objects sought by the government.
Pursuing the latter contention for the present, it is clear that a content-
based standard requiring more stringent fourth amendment protection does
exist where first amendment interests are implicated. 74 In Roaden v. Ken-
tucky, 75 a sheriff attended a drive-in movie, concluded it was obscene, went
to the projection booth and arrested the theatre manager on the ground of
showing an obscene film. Pursuant to the arrest, the officer seized one copy
of the film; the defendant was thereafter convicted. Because the issue of
obscenity was conceded by the defendant, the Supreme Court's reversal of the
conviction rested on fourth amendment grounds. Noting that "[a] seizure
reasonable as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a
different setting or with respect to another kind of material"76 and reiterating
the significance of "the nature of the materials seized" in determining fourth
amendment reasonableness, 77 the Court articulated a content-based, hierar-
chical conception of the fourth amendment. Under the fourth amendment,
according to the Court, the presence of first amendment interests "calls for a
higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness.17 8 In short, the content of
the seized evidence determined the constitutionality of the seizure. 79
"Numerous cases have held that the First Amendment 'modifies' the Fourth Amendment
to the extent that extra protections may boe required when First Amendment interests are in-
volved." Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 134 (N.D. Cal. 1972). affd and adopted
as the opinion of the court, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977). In A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378
U.S. 205 (1964), the Court held that a seizure of all the copies of 31 obscene books was pro-
cedurally unconstitutional. Mere probable cause of their obscenity was insufficient, for without
an adversary judicial determination of obscenity, first amendment interests would be unduly in-
fringed. Id. at 208, 213. This holding was narrowed, however, in Heller v. New York, 413 U.S.
483 (1973), where the Court held that a prior adversary determination of obscenity was not re-
quired where only one copy of an allegedly obscene film was seized. A Quantity of Books was
distinguished on the grounds that there a large quantity of books were seized "for the sole pur-
pose of their destruction." Id. at 491. The Heller Court, however, did recognize that first amend-
ment considerations modify the usual law of search and seizure and thus required a prompt
adversary determination of obscenity after seizure and an opportunity for a theatre owner to copy
the seized film. Id. at 492-93. See also Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
"5413 U.S. 496 (1973).
'lId. at 501.
71Id. at 503.
711d. at 504.
"It could be contended that the Roaden rationale is applicable only where first amend-
ment considerations are present. Although this is certainly a fair reading of the case, its holding
does indeed recognize a fourth amendment content-based hierarchy, even if a limited one.
Moreover, the same hierarchical analysis should apply to private papers. First, there is certainly
an overlap of interests protected by the first and fourth amendments-the communication and
expression inherent in private papers is not totally without first amendment implications. Nixon
v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455-68 (1977). Second, to the extent that
other constitutional rights are likewise implicated in private papers, notably the fifth amendment
and the general right of privacy, see notes 70-72 supra & text accompanying, the Roaden ra-
tionale applies with similar force. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) ("Would
we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives?").
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It has been forcefully contended that a content-based constitutional pro-
tection for private papers does not exist under current doctrine and that the
procedural requirements of the fourth amendment-probable cause and
specificity-are "the exclusive means of protecting personal privacy."80 To the
extent that the authors contend that all content-based considerations are ir-
relevant to fourth amendment protection, Roaden and other cases1 demon-
strate that this position is at least somewhat overstated. More fundamentally,
however, the position impliedly erects a much too rigid content-manner
dichotomy. Justice Stewart's analysis in his concurring opinion in Stanley v.
Georgia furnishes an illustration of the interplay between the content of the
evidence and the manner in which it is seized: the nature of the evidence
rendered it incapable of a "plain view" seizure, because a characterization of
the film as "obscene" could not be accomplished without actually viewing it.82
Moreover, the absence of an absolute content-based protection of private
papers does not compel the conclusion that content considerations are there-
fore irrelevant. For even given the primacy of the fourth amendment's pro-
cedural requirements, the interpretation of those requirements may properly
take into account the content of the evidence sought to be obtained and the
resulting invasion of privacy. Under a hierarchical view of the fourth amend-
ment, the uniquely private nature of private papers justifies a higher standard
of fourth amendment protection. In the absence of absolute protection, this
higher standard of protection can be obtained through a more stringent ap-
plication of the fourth amendment's procedural requirements.
Fourth Amendment Protection: Search and Seizure
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The fourth amendment consists of a general proscription against
"unreasonable searches and seizures" followed by the more specific directive
of the warrant clause: "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Although the
Supreme Court has never thoroughly addressed the relationship between the
two clauses of the fourth amendment,8 3 it is generally assumed that where the
express requirements of the warrant clause are satisfied, the search will be
held reasonable.8 4 The protections afforded to private papers by the warrant
8 0 HARVARD Note, supra note 1. at 979.
81See note 74 supra.
12See note 69 supra. The Stewart analysis applies just as strongly to a seizure of private
papers, whose evidentiary value could be ascertained only after reading them.
"
5See Weinreb, supra note 59, at 47-50. In United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1
(1977), the Court merely mentioned the "strong historical connection" between the two clauses.
Id. at 8.
14Weinreb, supra note 59, at 69-71. However, this is not invariably true. See notes 143-47
infra & text accompanying.
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requirement are therefore of central importance. The warrant clause contains
both substantive and procedural protections of privacy. A search warrant may
be obtained only upon a showing of "probable cause" and must "specifically
describe" the place to be searched and items to be seized. Moreover, in the
usual case, a warrant may be issued only by a neutral judicial officer on the
basis of sworn testimony.8 5
Probable Cause
The first requirement of the issuance of a search warrant is the existence
of probable cause-reasonable grounds to believe "that criminally related ob-
jects are in the place which the warrant authorizes to be searched, at the time
when the search is authorized to be conducted. " 86 In the context of private
papers, the protection afforded by the probable cause requirement is poten-
tially substantial. Before such a search may be undertaken pursuant to a war-
rant, the probable cause standard must be met by a demonstration that the
papers sought do or probably do exist and will be or probably will be of
evidentiary value in connection with a particular crime.8 7 Adherence to this
standard will result in a significant degree of protection for private papers,
8'See generally Amsterdam, supra note 73, at 358 & 444 nn. 90-95. The source of the
neutrality requirement, whether it be the reasonableness clause or the warrant clause, is of no
significance to this analysis.
181d. at 358 (citations omitted). Within this calculus is the requirement that there exist pro-
bable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
55 (1967). The same standard of probable cause applies to searches made without a warrant. See
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (probable cause is "a minimum requirement for a
reasonable search"); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). For a general discussion of
probable cause, see Armentano, The Standards for Probable Cause Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 44 CONN. B.J. 137 (1970); Note, Probable Cause: The Federal Standard, 25 OHIO ST. L.J.
502 (1964).
"
TSee Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (search for evidentiary items of
crime reasonable "only when there is 'probable cause' to believe that they will be uncovered in a
particular dwelling"). But see People ex rel. Carey v. Covelli, 61 Ill.2d 394, 336 N.E.2d 759
(1975). In Carey, the Illinois Supreme Court, through Justice Schaefer, upheld the validity of a
search warrant directed to the unknown contents of a desk, a safe, and a locked filing cabinet
belonging to a deceased underworld figure, Sam Giancana. On the issue of probable cause, the
court stated that the determination of probable cause "begins with a consideration of the nature
of the proceeding for which the evidence is sought." Id. at 403, 336 N.E.2d at 765. Despite the
lack of knowledge as to exactly what evidence was being sought and despite* the absence of any
pending criminal action, the probable cause standard was held to be satisfied. Id.
Although the court's rationale was not clearly articulated, three factors were deemed
ultimately persuasive. First, the existence of the desk, safe and cabinet was not in doubt. Second,
Giancana had been murdered in the basement of his home in circumstances indicating that the
killer had himself been looking for particular items which were likely to be found in the desk,
safe or cabinet. Finally, the court emphasized that an investigation for murder was involved. Not
only is the gravity of the offense an important factor in determining reasonableness, see LOYOLA
Comment, supra note 1, at 304-05, but the unavailability of the deceased would make a more
precise determination of probable cause difficult indeed. The Carey court's reliance on factors of
probability and practicality serves to emphasize that "[p]robable cause is a flexible concept which
does not lend itself to precise definition." LANDYNSKI, supra note 14, at 46.
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especially those of an intrapersonal nature. Requiring a showing of probable
cause as to the existence of the papers and their evidentiary relationship with
a crime would seem to provide almost complete protection against the seizure
of those papers that "constitute an integral aspect of a person's private
enclave."88
Moreover, a significant line of authority exists that is consistent with a
hierarchical view of the fourth amendment 9 and that justifies the application
of a more stringent standard of probable cause where the objects of the
search are private papers. It is now well established that the degree of in-
trusiveness of governmental conduct is a primary factor to be considered in
determining the validity of the conduct under the fourth amendment. In
Camara v. Municipal Court,90 the Court recognized that a so-called "ad-
ministrative search" is less intrusive than a typical search for evidence. 9' And
although the Court held that a warrant must be obtained before such
"searches" may be undertaken, they were permitted upon a showing of less-
than-traditional probable cause. 92 The significance of this holding has been
noted by Professor LaFave:
Most important, it seems, is the fact that the Court has taken the view that
the evidentiary requirement of the Fourth Amendment is not a rigid stand-
ard, requiring precisely the same quantum of evidence in all cases, but in-
stead is a flexible standard, permitting consideration of the public and in-
dividual interests as they are reflected in the facts of a particular case. 93
This interpretation of the fourth amendment was affirmed in Terry v.
Ohio, 94 where the Court held that a "stop and frisk," although constituting a
"Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 427 (Brennan, J., concurring). Cf. id. at 432 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) ("there is little reason to assume the present existence and possession of
most private papers").
"See notes 60-82 supra & text accompanying.
90387 U.S. 523 (1967).
91d. at 530 ("a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less
hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of
crime"); id. at 537 ("because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's
privacy").
"
5 In the context of housing code enforcement, the Court permitted "area inspections" if
conducted pursuant to a warrant. The probable cause standard articulated by the Court was very
general: "[I]t is obvious that 'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if
reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular dwelling." Id. at 538. Even more broadly phrased was a later state-
ment: "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause
to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." Id. at 539. See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721, 727 (1969) (because detentions for sole purpose of fingerprinting "may constitute a much
less serious intrusion upon personal security" than other types of searches, they may "under nar-
rowly defined circumstances" comply with the fourth amendment "even though there is no prob-
able cause in the traditional sense") (dictum).
IsLaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See
Cases, 1967 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 20.
"4392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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"search and seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, could be
conducted on less than the traditional standard of probable cause. The
fourth amendment, according to the Court, applies to all governmental intru-
sions upon personal security; however, "the scope of the particular intrusion,
in light of all the exigencies of the case" is to serve as a "central element" in
judging the constitutionality of the intrusion.9 5
If searches involving a comparatively low degree of intrusion can be con-
ducted pursuant to warrants issued on something less than probable cause,
there is no logical impediment to requiring a higher standard of probable
cause to justify a search of a highly intrusive character. Indeed, this analytic
framework was suggested in Schmerber v. California,96 which recognized that
in the past the power of police to search a suspect incident to a lawful arrest
was generally "unrestricted. "9' On the facts before it, however, the Court was
clear in stating that "the mere fact of a lawful arrest98 does not end our in-
quiry." 99 Whatever the validity of the considerations supporting the broad
power of a search incident to arrest in most cases,
they have little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions
beyond the body's surface. The interests in human dignity and privacy which
the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere
chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear in-
dication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human
interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disap-
pear unless there is an immediate search.100
This language of Schmerber supports the proposition that a highly intrusive
search may require a greater justification in terms of probable cause than'
does an ordinary search and seizure: 101 because a "search" within the body
"
5 Id. at 18 n.15. As in Camara, the standard of probable cause set down by the Terry
Court was a general one:
And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion .... And in making that assessment it is im-
perative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of seizure or search "warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?
Id. at 21-22 (footnotes and citations omitted).
"See note 25 supra.
97384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966).
"gThe Court found that "there was plainly probable cause" for the arrest. Id. at 768.
"Id. at 769.
'"
0Id. at 769-70 (emphasis supplied).
'
0 1Amsterdam, supra note 73, at 390, 463 n.393. A similar position was taken by Justice
Stewart, concurring in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 68-70 (1967). At issue in Berger was
the constitutionality of the New York eavesdropping statute, which permitted the issuance of a
warrant upon oath that "there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be
thus obtained." Id. at 43 n.l. Although the Court noted that this provision "raises a serious
probable-cause question under the Fourth Amendment." id. at 54-55, its holding rested on the
ground of impermissible generality. See notes 109-111 infra & text accompanying. Stewart,
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itself is such a serious intrusion on personal security, the Court seemed to sug-
gest that something more than traditional probable cause-a "clear indica-
tion"-be shown to justify the search. Professor Amsterdam has recognized
this position, noting that: "Together, Terry and Schmerber might support a
general fourth amendment theory that increasing degrees of intrusiveness re-
quire increasing degrees of justification and increasingly stringent procedures
for the establishment of that justification. °"10 2
In this sense, a hierarchical view of the fourth amendment has persuasive
authority and its extension to private papers is eminently logical. The unique
fourth amendment privacy interests inherent in private papers'"3 justify the
more stringent probable cause protection suggested in Schmerber. If Courts
are to consider the degree of instrusiveness of a search in analyzing the pro-
cedural requirements of the fourth amendment, it is only sensible to take into
account content considerations. In this way, the probable cause requirement
can furnish a significant amount of protection for private papers.
Specificity
The second substantive protection afforded by the warrant clause is the
specificity requirement. Only warrants "particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized" are lawful under the fourth
amendment.' 0 4 It is this requirement that most directly protects against the
evils of the general warrant, under which indiscriminate and unrestrained
searches were conducted as a matter of course.105 In Stanford v. Texas, 0 6 this
policy against general warrants was applied to invalidate a search conducted
pursuant to a Texas statute which outlawed the Communist Party and
authorized the issuance of warrants for the seizure of books, records or "any
however, concurred only in the result, believing that the affidavits in support of the warrant did
not constitute a showing of probable cause. After stating that "[t]he standard of reasonableness
embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands that the showing of justification match the degree
of intrusion," id. at 69, Stewart noted that the affidavits contained only bare references to
evidence in the government's possession. He then concluded: "[t]his might be enough to satisfy
the standards of the Fourth Amendment for a conventional search or arrest. But I think it was
constitutionally insufficient to constitute probable cause to justify an intrusion of the scope and
duration that was permitted in this case." Id. at 70 (citation omitted).
"'Amsterdam, supra note 73, at 390.
"eSee notes 61-72 supra & text accompanying.
104U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally Mascolo, Specificity Requirements For Warrants
under the Fourth Amendment: Defining the Zone of Privacy, 73 DICK. L. Ray. 1 (1968).
"'SSee Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); LANDYNsKI, supra note 14, at 45-46. The
function of the specificity requirement was described by the Supreme Court fifty years ago:
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion
of the officer executing the warrant.
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
106379 U.S. 476 (1965).
[Vol. 53:55
PRIVATE PAPERS
written instruments" that evidenced a violation of the Act. 10 7 To a large
degree, the holding of Stanford rests on the presence of first amendment con-
siderations. The specificity requirement, according to the Court, "is to be ac-
corded the most scrupulous exactitude when the 'things' [to be seized] are
books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain."108 No
such considerations, however, were present in Berger v. New York,' 09 where
the Court invalidated the New York eavesdropping statute. The statute
authorized the issuance of a court order upon the showing of a "reasonable
ground" to believe that criminal evidence would be obtained and required a
particular description of the person or persons whose conversations were to be
overheard "and the purpose thereof."110 This standard was insufficient under
the fourth amendment's specificity requirement: "the statute's failure to
describe with particularity the conversations sought gives the officer a roving
commission to 'seize' any and all conversations. . . . As with general warrants
this leaves too much to the discretion of the officer executing the order." ''
However, the Court's specificity objections do not seem insurmountable. Its
analysis on this point is sketchy, largely because the deficiency of the New
York statute was egregious. The Court hinted that a warrant describing the
type of conversation sought and the crime suspected would be sufficiently
particular." 2
Dictum in Berger, however, suggests that the required showing of
specificity may vary with the extent of the intrusion worked by a given search
and seizure, for the Court noted that "[t]he need for particularity . . . is
especially great in the case of eavesdropping" because of the nature of the in-
17Id. at 477. After obtaining such a warrant, Texas police went to defendant's home and
conducted a five-hour search, seizing 2000 books, pamphlets and papers. Id. The Supreme Court
vacated the Texas court's denial of defendant's motion to annul the warrants holding that it con-
stituted a general warrant prohibited by the fourth amendment. In full, the warrant authorized
the seizure of "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings
and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas, and the operations of
the Communist Party in Texas." Id. at 486. According to the Court: "The indiscriminate sweep
of that language is constitutionally intolerable. To hold otherwise would be false to the terms of
the Fourth Amendment, false to its meaning, and false to its history." Id.
1I8d. at 485 (footnote omitted). In fact, the Court made it clear that it was not deciding
"whether the description of the things to be seized would have been too generalized to pass con-
stitutional muster, had the things been weapons, narcotics or 'cases of whiskey.' " Id. at 486.
109388 U.S. 41 (1967).
10Id. at 43 n.1.
'"Id. at 59. See also id. at 55-56. The precedential value of Berger, however, may be
limited. In the first place, the precise holding of the decision is unclear because the Court found
many deficiencies in the New York statute apart from the lack of a specificity requirement.
These included the overly-long, two-month authorization period (characterized as "the equivalent
of a series of intrusions . . . pursuant to a single showing of probable cause"), the ease with
which extensions of this period could be authorized, and the lack of a termination date once the
conversation sought is seized. Id. at 58-60. The Court summarized its objections in very general
terms: "In short, the statutes blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop is without adequate
judicial supervision or protective procedures." Id. at 60. See 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 188-90
(1967).
"'See 388 U.S. at 56-57; 81 HARv. L. REV. at 189.
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trusion.13 The same idea was expressed in the Stanford case, where the Court
stated that the specificity requirement was "to be accorded the most
scrupulous exactitude" when first amendment interests were implicated in the
search.11 4 As with the variable standard of probable cause enunciated in
Camara, Terry and Schmerber,n ' language in Berger and Stanford suggests
that a higher standard of specificity will be required for more intrusive sear-
ches. 1 6 The intrusive nature of a search for private papers" 7 justifies a
similarly stringent standard of specificity. At the least, where private papers
are involved, courts should take care to ensure that the specificity require-
ment is accorded more than lip service.
Potentially, the fourth amendment requirement of particularity in the
description of things to be seized provides a significant degree of protection to
private papers. In simplistic terms, if personal papers sought by the govern-
ment can be particularly described, they may well not be "private." Converse-
ly, truly private papers may be incapable of sufficiently particular description
to justify their seizure pursuant to a search warrant. In practical effect,
however, the protection of the specificity requirement is much more limited.
Courts seem to follow a general rule which requires only that the description
of items sought be "as specific as the circumstances of the particular case per-
mit,""' 8 so that the protection afforded by the specificity requirement may be
more apparent than real." 9 A similar conclusion may be drawn from the
"'388 U.S. at 56. Because of the intrusive nature of an eavesdropping "search," implicating
the policies underlying the fourth and fifth amendments, the Court stated that governmental use
of eavesdropping devices "imposes 'a heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the
fairness of procedures'." Id., quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
"
4Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). Although Stanford is distinguishable on the
basis of the first amendment considerations involved there, it nevertheless suggests that the re-
quirements of the fourth amendment's specificity provision may be more stringent for more in-
trusive searches. What made the search in Stanford highly intrusive was the fact that it impinged
on first amendment interests.
"'See notes 90-102 supra & text accompanying.
1"The Court's statement in Berger was based on its view of the intrusive nature of electronic
eavesdropping: "By its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in
scope." 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967). See note 113 supra. Likewise in Stanford, the search was highly
intrusive because it touched upon first amendment interests. See text accompanying note 108
supra. Thus, "[t]he general requirement of particularity in warrants is more strictly applied in
situations involving the seizure of materials which arguably fall within the First Amendments
protection of free expression." United States v. Manarite, 314 F. Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(footnote omitted).
"7See notes 61-72 supra & text accompanying.
"United States v. Robinson, 287 F. Supp. 245, 256 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
"'An extreme example of how little particularity may be held sufficient to sup-port a war-
rant is presented in People ex reL. Carey v. Covelli, 61 111. 2d 394, 336 N.E.2d 759 (1975). At
issue in Carey was the validity of a search warrant directed to the unknown contents of a desk, a
safe, and a locked filing cabinet belonging to Sam Giancana, a leading underworld figure who
had been murdered in his home. On the theory that their contents would aid in discovery of the
killer's identity, the State's Attorney obtained a warrant to search the desk, safe and cabinet. In
sustaining the search, the court was forced to concede, by way of an understatement, that the
objects of the search were "not described with particularity" in the warrant. Id. at 404, 336
N.E.2d at 765. This defect, however, was not fatal under the court's decidedly pragmatic ap-
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Supreme Court's decision in Andresen v. Maryland. 120 Andresen involved a
real estate fraud investigation which culminated in the conviction of the
defendant on counts of false pretenses and misappropriation of a fiduciary in
connection with his settlement activities relating to certain realty. The
government investigators obtained warrants to search Andresen's law office
and the separate office of a real estate corporation of which he was sole
shareholder. Each warrant named a long list of items "pertaining to sale,
purchase, settlement and conveyance" of Lot 13-T and concluded with the
phrase "together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at
this (time) unknown."' 21 The defendant challenged the searches of his offices
on the ground that they were conducted pursuant to general warrants, con-
tending that the concluding phrase in the warrants rendered them "fatally
general."'1 22 The Court, however, narrowly construed the phrase as limited to
evidence relating to the crime of false pretenses with respect to Lot 13-T.
With this limiting construction, the Court concluded that the warrants "did
not authorize the executing officers to conduct a search for evidence of other
crimes,"' 123 and that they were therefore not violative of the fourth amend-
ment's specificity requirement.
The Court's analysis suffers from two defects. First, its limiting construc-
tion of the warrants is necessarily post facto. 124 An even more significant
shortcoming, however, is the failure to consider the extent of the searches
conducted under the warrants. The search in Andresen resulted in the seizure
of 80 items, of which 62 were either returned by the government or suppressed
proach. The legality of the search and the sufficiency of the warrant were to be determined not
by whether there was compliance with the express requirements of the warrant clause, but rather
were to be judged under the broad rubric of reasonableness. Id. The use of a reasonableness
standard necessarily involves some type of interest balancing. The state's interest in solving the
murder of Giancana was clear. The countervailing interest was a concern for the privacy of the
deceased's daughters. The balance was struck by permitting the search, but providing for an in
camera examination of the seized contents, at which time questions of relevance and privilege
could be resolved. Under the analysis, the Carey court effectively read out of the fourth amend-
ment any specificity requirement whatsoever.
"20427 U.S. 463 (1976).
1id. at 480-81 n.10.
"'2The defendant also argued that the list of items contained in the warrants was so inclusive
as to constitute a general warrant. The Court rejected this position in a footnote, emphasizing
the complexity of the crime involved and the clear showing of probable cause made by the
government. Id. Berger v. New York was distinguished on the basis of the complete lack of par-
ticularity in the warrants at issue in that case.
"2'427 U.S. at 481-82.
1'Nowhere in its discussion does the Court consider how the warrants were interpreted by
the investigators at the time of execution, nor does the Court come to grips with the nature and
extent of the searches conducted pursuant to the warrants. As Justice Brennan's terse dissent
points out, the Court's limiting construction of the warrants was not available to those executing
the warrants. According to Brennan, the test for determining whether the warrants were suffi-
ciently particular is not one of hindsight, "but how they were in fact viewed by those executing
them." 427 U.S. at 493. On this point there was testimony in the record indicating that many of
Andresen's papers were seized indiscriminately. Id. at 493 n.8.
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by the trial court for lack of relevancy to the crime charged. 125 When 75% of
the items seized pursuant to a warrant are irrelevant to the prosecution's case,
that warrant can hardly be said to leave no discretion to the person executing
it.1 26 Nor should such a warrant be held, under the fourth amendment, to
particularly describe the evidence it purports to have seized. On the facts of
Andresen, Justice Brennan seems correct in his view that "[t]he overwhelming
quantity of seized material that was either suppressed or returned to peti-
tioner is irrefutable testimony to the unlawful generality of the warrants." 127
The Andresen Court's lack of sensitivity to the generality of the search greatly
reduces the protection afforded private papers by the fourth amendment's
specificity requirement.
Institutional Aspects of the Warrant Requirement
A final protection afforded by the warrant clause to private papers-
which may be termed an institutional one-is not easily measured without
venturing into the realm of social psychology. Although it may be "notorious-
ly easy for prosecutors to obtain search warrants,"' 28 it is still likely that
adherence to the warrant requirement is not without a protective effect.
Recognizing that judicial approval through the warrant procedure often par-
takes of the "rubberstamp," one commentator nevertheless concluded:
Just the same, adherence to the procedure obliges the police to deliberate
before making a search, to determine in advance how wide the search will
be, and to articulate the reason for the search with some specificity. The
police might be required also, on a nonconstitutional basis, to state in ad-
vance their conclusion that the need to search outweighs the intrusion, and to
give reasons for the conclusion if they are not obvious. No doubt such
statements would often be boilerplate. But sometimes they would not; how
seriously the police responded to such a requirement would depend on how
seriously we took their responses. In any event, even boilerplate offers some
protection.129
2'5 Id. at 467.
2'2 At the outset of its discussion of the issue, the Court routinely expressed the standard that
under a properly specific search warrant, "nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant." Id. at 480, quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). See note
105 supra.
127427 U.S. at 493. Apart from the specificity issue, the facts of Andresen illustrate another
potential fourth amendment problem with the search and seizure of private papers. Such
searches are inherently intrusive because they almost necessarily possess an exploratory character:
in the usual case, all of an individual's papers will need to be examined in order to determine
which ones are within the warrant description. This is true no matter how particularly the papers
sought under the warrant are described. The issue therefore goes to the broader standard of
reasonableness under the fourth amendment rather than to compliance with warrant clause re-
quirements. See notes 148-149 infra & text accompanying.
"2'Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 169, 190-91 (1969).1
'
2Weinreb, supra note 59, at 72.
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In short, the mere fact that an officer or agent is required to go before a
magistrate and ask permission to conduct a search, and in the course of the
request to justify and describe the search he desires to undertake, is beneficial
to privacy concerns." 0
THE REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLENESS
Under the fourth amendment's first clause, all "unreasonable searches
and seizures" are forbidden. The primary focus of judicial concern under this
clause arises in the context of warrantless searches in which a court must
determine whether to uphold a given search and seizure on the ground of
reasonableness. Generally, there is something akin to a presumption of
unreasonableness for searches conducted without a warrant. At the least, such
searches are definitely disfavored;"' however, where a warrant has been ob-
tained, the search will most often be held reasonable."12 In short, the warrant
requirement is generally viewed as a sufficient but not a necessary condition
to satisfy the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard.
This conclusion is by no means compelled by the language or history of
the fourth amendment. The two clauses of the fourth amendment are gram-
matically independent and there is no conceptual obstacle to a holding that
the reasonableness requirement "transcends the procedural safeguards of par-
ticularity and probability in the second clause."' s s Moreover, the position that
the reasonableness requirement has operational significance apart from the
warrant clause is supported by the history and policies of the fourth amend-
ment. As Professor Amsterdam points out, the warrant clause alone is clearly
sufficient to combat the evils of the general warrant;" 4 and because "the
framers were disposed to generalize to some exent beyond the evils of the im-
mediate past,"' 1 5 the conclusion that the fourth amendment's proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures imposes limitations on governmen-
'"The salutory effects of the warrant requirement were recently noted by the Supreme
Court:
Once a lawful search has begun, it is also far more likely that it will not exceed proper
bounds when it is done pursuant to a judicial authorization "particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." Further, a warrant
assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of
the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (citation omitted).
'See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting earlier cases
for the proposition that the warrant requirement is "subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions"); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358 (1977).
1"t Weinreb, supra note 59, at 69-70.
"IT. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 67 (1969).
"3'Amsterdam, supra note 73, at 399.
'Id. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) ("the Framers were men
who focused on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard
fundamental values which would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth").
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tal activity beyond those of the warrant clause is a proper one. The protec-
tion afforded by the reasonableness clause may be based on either the nature
of the evidence sought or the manner in which it is obtained. Once again,
however, it must be emphasized that the content-manner dichotomy is not a
rigid one.
Historically, the position that the reasonableness requirement of the
fourth amendment prohibits the seizure of certain evidence based solely upon
its nature or content is a very familiar one; but with the rejection of the mere
evidence rule 3 6 in Warden v. Hayden,"' the availability of an absolute
content-based protection was called into question. In essence, characterizing
the seizure of certain private papers as unreasonable per se would recognize a
private inner sanctum into which government may not intrude. By clear im-
plication, however, the Andresen decision has rejected such a construction of
the reasonableness clause. 3 8 Indeed, commentators treat the issue as une-
quivocally settled that in terms of the content of the evidence seized, the
reasonableness clause adds nothing whatsoever to the protection of the war-
rant clause. 3 9 Arguments for a contrary interpretation, espousing an absolute
protection for certain types of private papers, are better made to legis-
latures 140 and state courts. 41
In the absence of an absolute content-based protection under the
reasonableness clause, courts have focused their inquiry primarily upon the
manner in which a search is undertaken and conducted. It does not follow
'Under the mere evidence rule, items which were neither contraband nor fruits or in-
strumentalities of a crime, items of purely evidentiary value, were not seizable under the fourth
amendment. See generally Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEo. L.J.
593 (1966). Because private papers were seldom within the categories of contraband, fruits or in-
strumentalities, the mere evidence rule served as an independent basis for constitutional protec-
tion.
137387 U.S. 294 (1967). Hayden, anticipating the private papers issue, expressly reserved the
question of "whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from
being the object of a reasonable search and seizure." Id. at 303.
IssAndresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). The significance of Andresen in this regard
lies in the fact that although the evidence was treated as incriminating and testimonial in the
fifth amendment sense, none of the three opinions in the case so much as adverted to the
possibility that the reasonableness requirement had an independent significance.
'See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 59, at 69-70; HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 979.
I4sThe ALI has recognized a class of documents which, under its model code, are immune
from governmental seizure:
Documents Not Subject to Seizure. With the exception of handwriting samples,
and other writings or recordings of evidentiary value for reasons other than their
testimonial content, things subject to seizure under Subsection (1)(a) shall not include
personal diaries, letters, or other writings or recordings, made solely for private use or
communication to an individual occupying a family, personal or other confidential
relation, other than a relation in criminal enterprise, unless such things have served or
are serving a substantial purpose in furtherance of a criminal enterprise.
ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 210.3(2) (1975).
141State constitutional guarantees are being invoked by criminal defendants and relied upon
by state courts with increasing frequency. For a discussion, see Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977), and authorities cited therein.
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from this, however, that content-based considerations are irrelevant. Indeed,
this paper has advocated that such considerations, because they are relevant
in determining the intrusiveness of a search, should influence the application
of the fourth amendment's procedural safeguards.142 Moreover, a court's con-
stitutional inquiry cannot end when it is satisfied that the procedural re-
quirements of the warrant clause have been complied with. There are many
examples of searches which have been held unreasonable under the fourth
amendment despite compliance with the requirements of probable cause and
specificity. 143 In Stanford Daily v. Zurcher,14 for example, a search was
declared unreasonable on the ground that there existed less intrusive means
by which to obtain the evidence sought. 45 In addition, the manner in which
a search is executed is relevant to a determination of its reasonableness: a
search subsequent to an illegal entry, otherwise valid, will be held
unlawful.' 4 6 Finally, there are certain searches and seizures which because of
their intrusive nature are almost unreasonable per se, despite the existence of
probable cause. 47
Logically, these cases establish that the reasonableness clause has
significance independent of the warrant clause on issues relating to the man-
ner in which a search and seizure is executed. From this premise, the proposi-
tion can be advanced that the manner in which a search of private papers is
usually conducted provides a conceptual basis for declaring such searches
unreasonable. A search involving private papers is uniquely intrusive. Because
the search for private papers, even if particularly described in the warrant,
invariably necessitates the perusal of other wholly innocent papers, 48 such a
search partakes of the same generality characteristic of the sweeping ex-
ploratory searches at which the fourth amendment was directed.14 9 Therefore,
"'See notes 90-102, 113-17 supra & text accompanying.
"'Perhaps the most familiar example of this situation is a search which, although valid at
its inception, is held unreasonable due to the manner in which it is thereafter conducted. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968).
"41353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd and adopted as the opinion of the court, 550
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
"'Id. at 127-30. See LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Pro-
cedures" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 158-60.
"'See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963) ("the method of entering the home may of-
fend federal constitutional standards of reasonableness and therefore vitiate the legality of an ac-
companying search"); People v. Stephens, 18 Ill. App. 3d 817, 310 N.E.2d 755 (1974). See also
United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032 (5th Cir. 1970) ("fraud, deceit or trickery in ob-
taining access to incriminating evidence can make an otherwise lawful search unreasonable").
"'In Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973), a court-ordered surgical opera-
tion to remove a bullet from the body of a suspect was declared unconstitutional as an
unreasonable search and seizure. See also United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal.
1949) (stomach pumping constitutes unreasonable search and seizure).
' Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).
"'State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 515-16, 213 A.2d 185, 191 (1965). See United States v.
Zive. 299 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Cf United States v. Beck, 511 F.2d 997, 1003 (6th
Cir. 1975) (seizure of one page of spiral notebook reasonable, the court noting that "there was
not extensive rummaging").
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the position that the search and seizure of private papers is unreasonable
under the fourth amendment is conceptually consistent even with the modem
emphasis on the manner of the search rather than on the content of the
evidence.
The Andresen Court recognized the intrusive nature of a search involving
personal papers, noting that there are "grave dangers" in such a search due
to the fact that many innocent papers will have to be examined in the course
of the search.150 Having stated the problem, however, the Court went no fur-
ther with it, content with a meaningless admonishment to "responsible of-
ficials" to behave "in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon
privacy."'' The implication of Andresen is that the intrusive nature of a
search for private papers, although regrettable, is not of constitutional
significance. 152
Fourth Amendment Protection: Compulsory Process
In the Boyd case, it will be recalled, a court order directing the produc-
tion of a partnership invoice was held to constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment.153 The rule of almost per
se unreasonableness enunciated there was soon greatly modified by limiting
fourth amendment objections to subpoenas primarily to claims of relevancy
and overbreadth.15 4 Later decisions evidence a similar very high degree of
judicial deference toward the investigative powers of administrative bodies
and grand juries. As recently as 1946, in the major case of Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling,'55 the Court expressed doubt as to whether the
150427 U.s. at 482 n.11.
'
5 Id. The Court's language, hopefully inadvertent, is very interesting. One would assume
that "unwarranted" intrusions upon privacy are "unreasonable" under the fourth amendment.
Literally, that is not what the Court tells us. Rather, such "unwarranted" intrusions need not be
forbidden, but merely "minimized."
"2This implication pervades the Andresen majority opinion; however, such a conclusion
must be tempered in light of the concern for privacy expressed in Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Under the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1974), 42 million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings relating to
Nixon's term in office were to be scrutinized by government archivists. It was not disputed that
some of the papers and tapes, albeit a very small percentage, 433 U.S. at 454-56, contained very
personal and wholly private matters.
The several opinions that discuss Nixon's privacy claim all evince a concern for privacy
markedly stronger than its perfunctory treatment in Andresen. See id. at 487-91 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 525-36 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Court's opinion rejected the claim, id.
at 455-65, but only after thorough consideration and a careful balancing of interests.
153Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See notes 17-19 supra & text accompanying.
'
5 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The subpoena in Hale was not enforced because
it was held to be "far too sweeping in its terms." Id. at 76.
15327 U.S. 186 (1946). Oklahoma Press involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Wage
and Hour Administrator in the course of investigations under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' enforcement of the subpoenas.
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fourth amendment imposed any limitations on the subpoena process. 156 The
analysis in most court decisions discussing the application of the fourth
amendment to documentary subpoenas is inaccurate and incomplete. First,
the Court's statement in Oklahoma Press that the enforcement of a subpoena
presents "no question of actual search and seizure"'1 7 fundamentally mis-
conceives the scope of the fourth amendment's protection. Second, most
decisions fail to subject fully the subpoena process to the requirement of
reasonableness. Moreover, the privacy interests in private papers under a
hierarchical theory of the fourth amendment require a higher substantive
standard of reasonableness than has traditionally been applied to the sub-
poena process.
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
At the outset, it should no longer be controverted that an order for the
production of papers constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. The Boyd Court's holding that a documentary sub-
poena, because it "effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure,"
is fully within the scope of the fourth amendment,1s8 remains persuasive. A
contrary conclusion must be based solely on a literal interpretation of the
fourth amendment's language. Such a literal reading of search and seizure is
exactly the "close construction" of constitutional guarantees that Boyd cau-
tioned against.159
The Court in Oklahoma Press was quite clear that a "basic distinction"
existed between actual and figurative searches and seizures, although no ra-
tionale was offered to support this distinction. 6 0 This view of the fourth
"'See 327 U.S. at 195 (enforcement of subpoenas presents "no question of actual search and
seizure"); id. at 208 (the fourth amendment, if applicable, of limited scope). And, assuming ap-
plicability, the role of the amendment was held to be an extremely limited one:
[The fourth amendment] at the most guards against abuse only by way of too much
indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be "particularly described," if also
the inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the
materials specified are relevant. The gist of the protection is in the requirement, ex-
pressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.
Id. at 208. See also id. at 209: "It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose, within the power of Congress to command." See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE §§ 3.01-3.12 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]. These same standards apply to
grand jury subpoenas. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 632-43 (1950);
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79
(2d Cir. 1973).
"p327 U.S. at 195.
11116 U.S. at 622.
"'Id. at 635.
"'See 327 U.S. at 202, 204. The Court's analysis assumed its conclusion: "Only in this
analogical sense can any question related to search and seizure be thought to arise in situations
which, like the present ones, involve only the validity of authorized judicial orders." Id. at 202.
The fact that a great deal of constitutional decision making is founded on an "analogical sense,"
Boyd being a quintessential example, was ignored. Boyd itself was distinguished in one sentence,
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amendment was quite consistent with the prevailing mode of interpretation
expressed in Olmstead v. United States.'6' Olmstead held that wiretapping
was wholly outside the fourth amendment because it did not constitute a
search and seizure. Under the Court's literalistic analysis, the fourth amend-
ment protected only "persons, houses, papers, and effects," and therefore did
not apply to a "search" of an intangible conversation. 16 Neither was wiretap-
ping held to constitute a fourth amendment "seizure": there was no trespass
involved and evidence was obtained solely through the sense of hearing. 63
Although the Olmstead decision was not cited in Oklahoma Press, the later
opinion, in expressing doubt as to the applicability of the fourth amendment
to the subpoena process, exhibited a similar rigidity of interpretation.
Olmstead's narrow reading of the fourth amendment was finally over-
ruled in Katz v. United States.'6' Katz rejected a literal interpretation of
search and seizure, holding that "the reach of [the fourth amendment] can-
not turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure."' 65 This broader interpretation of the scope of the fourth amend-
ment 66 has been reinforced by other decisions 6 7 and now seems firmly
established. Under this interpretation, a documentary subpoena, because it
constitutes a governmental invasion of an individual's security and privacy, is
within the scope of the fourth amendment even though the actual physical in-
trusion of the classic search and seizure is lacking. This result, in fact, has
been reiterated by the Supreme Court on a number of occasions. 68
In short, because a subpoena ordering the production of private papers is
a form of governmental intrusion into an individual's privacy and security
and because it is functionally equivalent in purpose to an actual search and
on the ground that the statute involved provided "a drastically incriminating method of en-
forcement." Id. at 208. This "distinction," although proper for fifth amendment purposes, does
not go to the question of fourth amendment applicability to subpoenas.
1--277 U.S. 438 (1928).
1111d. at 464.6 Id. at 464-66.
164389 U.S. 347 (1967).
111d. at 353.
"
6 6
"The vision of the Fourth Amendment that emerges from [Katz] is that any effort by a
government agent to obtain information falls within the ban of the Fourth Amendment if it in-
trudes upon a citizen's security." Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 1968 Sup. Gr. Rxv. 133, 134.
167See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). One issue in Terry was whether a stop and
frisk constituted a search and seizure within the fourth amendment. The Court held that it did
and stated that previous distinctions between a mere stop and a full arrest were to be discarded
for purposes of deciding the fourth amendment's applicability. Search and seizure are not
talismans, said the Court, and the previous distinctions merely "serve to divert attention from the
central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment-the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the
particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Id. at 19. A documentary sub-
poena should be viewed in the same way-as a "governmental invasion of a citizen's personal
security"- and thus within the fourth amendment.
'
66See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 544 (1967).
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seizure, such a subpoena must be held to be within the protective ambit of
the fourth amendment. The constitutional literalism of the Olmstead decisioa
has been rightfully rejected and should not be resurrected in this context. 16 9
REASONABLENESS AND SUBPOENAS
It is well established that the issuance of a governmental subpoena need
not comply with the probable cause and specificity requirements of the fourth
amendment. 170 As a general proposition, this is perfectly acceptable, for the
ultimate standard by which to judge the validity of a fourth amendment in-
trusion is reasonableness and, other things being equal, obtaining evidence by
a subpoena is less intrusive than the same acquisition accomplished pursuant
to an actual search and seizure.1 71 It is this fact which provides the most
cogent rationale for not subjecting subpoenas to the requirements of the war-
rant clause. 172
t"Nevertheless, it has been suggested, by respectable authority, that the constitutional pro-
tection against an overbroad documentary subpoena "rests not on the Fourth Amendment but on
the less rigid requirements of the due process clause." In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir.
1973) (Friendly, J.). In addition to quoting language from Oklahoma Press, see note 156 supra &
text accompanying, Horowitz placed reliance upon United States v. Dionisio 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
In Dionisio, a grand jury investigation had obtained certain recordings and subpoenaed approx-
imately twenty people to appear before the grand jury and give voice exemplars. Dionisio based
his refusal to comply on fourth and fifth amendment grounds. The Court stated that the fourth
amendment was relevant in two ways and then rejected each one. First, the Court held that a
subpoena to appear before a grand jury does not consttute a "seizure' in the fourth amendment
sense, based primarily on "the historically grounded obligation of every person to appear and
give his evidence before the grand jury." Id. at 9-10. Second, the grand jury's directive to furnish
the voice exemplar was held not to violate the fourth amendment because Dionisio could have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the physical characteristics of his voice. What a person
"knowingly exposes to the public" is not protected by the fourth amendment. Id. at 14, quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). This same rationale was relied upon in the com-
panion case of Dionirio, United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973), a case involving a grand jury
directive to produce a handwriting exemplar. See notes 175-178 infra & text accompanying.
In each part of its analysis, however, Dionisio is clearly distinguishable from the case of a
subpoena directing the production of private papers. Even assuming that an order to appear
before the grand jury does not constitute a fourth amendment seizure, a conclusion not free from
dispute, see, e.g., 410 U.S. at 38-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting), Dionisio itself emphasized that a
grand jury subpoena is not a "talisman that dissolves all constitutional protections." The Court
explicitly noted that the grand jury's subpoena duces tecum power is limited by the fourth
amendment. 410 U.S. at 11. The second holding of Dionisio, that the physical characteristics of
a person's voice are not protected by the fourth amendment because they are knowingly exposed
to the public, see Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 459 (1977) (citing
Dionis'o for this proposition), is of course inapplicable to a situation in which private papers are
sought. Not only are such papers not exposed to the public, but they fall within the very core of
the fourth amendment right of privacy.
"OSee United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-54 (1950); DAVIS, supra note
156, § 3.12.
"'lStanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd and adopted as
the opinion of the court, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
172A failure fully to appreciate this fact has led some authorities to the conclusion that sub-
poenas need not comply with the probable cause and specificity requirements because they are
not within the scope of the fourth amendment. Professor Davis, for example, argued that the ra-
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Therefore, to determine the fourth amendment validity of a documentary
subpoena, some substantive content must be given to the general standard of
reasonableness. As to corporate books and records, because true privacy in-
terests are generally not implicated,17 S the reasonableness standard is easily
satisfied. 74 Outside of the corporate context, where the production of papers
by an individual is sought to be compelled, the proper standard is less cer-
tain. In United States v. Mara, 17 5 the Supreme Court held that a grand jury
need not make a preliminary showing of reasonableness before issuing a sub-
poena directing production of handwriting and printing exemplars, reversing
the court of appeals, which had imposed a minimal reasonableness require-
ment upon the subpoena process.1 76 On the issue of the application of the
fourth amendment to subpoenas, however, Mara is not dispositive, for its
holding is quite narrow. Because an individual's handwriting is repeatedly
tionale of the Boyd case compelled the following syllogism: (1) compulsory production pursuant
to a subpoena constitutes a search and seizure; (2) probable cause must be established to obtain a
warrant authorizing a search and seizure; therefore, (3) probable cause is required for the com-
pulsory production of records. DAvis, supra note 156, § 3.12. Because the conclusion of this
syllogism is contrary to settled law, a temptation exists to ascribe the error to the first premise. It
should be clear, however, that this is not the case; rather, it is the intermediate premise that is
faulty: probable cause is not required to justify every "search and seizure." Once it is recognized
that the ultimate standard under the fourth amendment is reasonableness, the logical consistency
of holding subpoenas within the scope of the fourth amendment yet not subject to the warrant
clause requirements becomes apparent.
"'sSee G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) (a business may be
subject to "intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context").
'
74See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.a. 541 (1967). The Court stated: "It is now settled that,
when an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the Fourth Amendment re-
quires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in
directive, so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome." Id. at 544. See also
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946), supra note 156.
M;5410 U.S. 19 (1973).
'
T 6Mara had been directed by the grand jury to furnish it with handwriting and printing ex-
emplars and had refused. The district court, after considering in camera an affidavit submitted
by an FBI agent, ordered Mara to comply. On appeal, the court held that the order was subject
to the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement and proceeded to analyze that require-
ment. In re September 1971 Grand Jury (Mara), 454 F.2d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1971). On the facts,
the court of appeals fashioned a two-pronged standard of reasonableness. The first requirement
was procedural: the government was required to present its affidavit in open court so that Mara
could contest its sufficiency. Id. at 582-84. Second, the court imposed substantive requirements
upon the government. Reasonableness, the court emphasized, was not synonymous with probable
cause, but did require a showing that "the grand jury investigation was properly authorized, for a
purpose Congress can order, that the information sought is relevant to the inquiry, and that the
grand jury's request for exemplars is 'adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes of the relevant
inquiry.' " Id. at 584-85, quoting Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209
(1946). The "adequate, but not excessive" standard was interpreted to require an affirmative
showing "that the grand jury process is not being abused." Id. at 585. The court presented two
instances which it thought would constitute an abuse of the grand jury process. First, the govern-
ment should not be permitted "to conduct a general fishing expedition under grand jury sponsor-
ship with the mere explanation that the witnesses are potential defendants." Id. Second, the
government must show why satisfactory exemplars "cannot be obtained from other sources
without grand jury compulsion." Id. Because the government had failed to satisfy either the pro-
cedural or the substantive reasonableness standards prescribed by the court, Mara was granted a
short-lived reversal.
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shown to the public, the court reasoned, no protectable expectation of
privacy exists therein and the grand jury directive violated no legitimate
fourth amendment interest of Mara's; therefore, the Court held that the
government was under no obligation to make a preliminary showing of
reasonableness.1 77 The Court's analysis was thus at an end upon resolution of
the threshold question of fourth amendment applicability. Because that
amendment provides no protection for physical characteristics that are know-
ingly exposed to the public, such as a person's voice or handwriting, a
"seizure" of them need not be "reasonable," at least in terms of the fourth
amendment. Were a subpoena directed to private papers, however, a deter-
mination of reasonableness would be necessary.1 78 In this context, the reason-
ableness standard adopted by the court of appeals in Mara is not only
justifiable, but provides insufficient fourth amendment protection to private
papers.
The substantive standard of reasonableness propounded by the court of
appeals in Mara is essentially the standard applicable to an administrative
subpoena for corporate books and records.1 7 9 Because the fourth amendment
privacy interests in an individual's private papers are obviously greater than
those in a corporation's business records, a hierarchical conception of the
fourth amendment requires a higher standard of protection for the former
than that provided by the Mara court. Indeed, the fourth amendment may
well impose a showing approaching that of probable cause and specificity to
justify the governmental procurement of private papers even pursuant to a
subpoena. Militating against this position, however, are the following two fac-
tors: (1) the lesser degree of intrusion involved with a subpoena, and (2) the
effect of more stringent fourth amendment requirements on the ad-
ministrative or grand jury processes. Although these considerations do require
that the fourth amendment reasonableness balance be struck in a different
fashion where a subpoena rather than a search warrant is utilized, they do
not justify the high degree of deference characteristic of the current state of
the law.
A subpoena for the production of papers avoids much of the intrusiveness
inherent in a search, which will often partake of a general rummaging.
Nevertheless, the privacy interests in the papers themselves80 are impinged
upon equally through either a subpoena or a physical search. An absolute
117410 U.S. at 21-22. The Mara decision was very brief because nearly identical issues had
been presented in the companion case of United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1975).
"saThis conclusion, of course, is based on a very narrow reading of Mara and is contrary to
established law which imposes no requirement of substantive reasonableness other than a very
deferential standard. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (grand jury may
compel production of evidence "as it considers appropriate").
'
79The court of appeals, in formulating its reasonableness standard, borrowed heavily from
the Supreme Court's permissive standard in Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,
208-09 (1946). See note 156 supra.
185See notes 61-64, 67-72 supra & text accompanying.
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content-based protection would therefore not distinguish between the two
methods of procurement. 81 In the absence of such an approach, however,
the distinction must be recognized. The proper standard of fourth amend-
ment reasonableness applicable to a subpoena of private papers reduces to a
value judgment. Simply stated, the values implicit in a hierarchical theory of
the fourth amendment dictate that the privacy interests in private papers be
given more weight than they are given under present law.
In addition, the imposition of more stringent fourth amendment safe-
guards upon the issuance of documentary subpoenas would not unduly
burden the investigative processes of the administrative body. In the context
of the grand jury, the Supreme Court has spoken strongly against the imposi-
tion of procedural requirements that would hamper the functioning of that
body: "Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and
preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate
the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal
laws." 18 2 This language, however, should not be read too broadly in that the
presence of any constitutional safeguards inherently "impedes" the process of
investigation and the Court itself has recognized that "[t]he grand jury is also
without power to invade a legitimate privacy interest protected by the fourth
amendment."1 8 3 Moreover, as a practical matter it is doubtful that requiring
a more stringent justification for the issuance of a subpoena seeking private
papers would seriously impede investigation by administrative bodies. 1 84
Requiring a showing closely approximating the probable cause and
specificity standards of the warrant clause to justify the issuance of a sub-
poena for private papers appears to be unprecedented. However, such a
result is theoretically justified by the privacy interests at the heart of the
fourth amendment. Practically, this result may be necessary to prevent the
circumvention of the warrant clause requirements by the government through
resort to the subpoena process.185
8
'See HARVARD Note, supra note 1, at 986.
"
8 tUnited States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
"United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974).
18
4 It should be emphasized that this proposed standard applies only to subpoenas directed
toward private papers and not to other types of evidence such as corporate records. Given this
limited focus, fears of undue interference with the administrative or grand jury process are not
substantial. A possible qualification to this statement is suggsted in the Dionisio opinion, where
the Court criticized the court of appeals' decision in Mara. The Mara court had required the
government to show in an adversary proceeding that its request for handwriting exemplars was
reasonable. The significance of the lower court's holding was not the requirement of reason-
ableness, but the requirement of an adversary determination of that fact. Arguably, it is the
adversarial requirement that would lead to the burdensome "minitrials" feared by the Court. See
410 U.S. at 17 n.16. This interpretation of the Dionisio dictum does not vitiate the analysis sug-
gested here, for there is no reason why the showing of "reasonableness," whatever its substantive
content, cannot be accomplished ex parte as it is in the issuance of a search warrant.
'"
5Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dionisio and Mara, expressed concern over the possibility
of "prosecutorial exploitation of the grand jury process," fearing that law enforcement officials
could accomplish indirectly what they could not do directly. See 410 U.S. at 47-51.
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CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court recognized last term,1 86 substantial privacy in-
terests exist in an individual's private papers. With the fifth amendment
privilege rendered inapplicable, constitutional protection for private papers
must come from the fourth amendment, the fundamental purpose of which is
the protection of personal privacy against governmental intrusions. Given this
basic purpose and the amendment's generalized standard of reasonableness, a
hierarchical conception of fourth amendment protection should be recognized.
Under a hierarchical theory, a higher standard of fourth amendment protec-
tion is afforded against more serious governmental invasions of privacy.
A limited fourth amendment hierarchy has been acknowledged in other
contexts and its extension to private papers is fully justified by the private
nature of the papers themselves, the inherently intrusive nature of a search
through such papers, and the fact that private papers implicate several other
constitutional guarantees. With private papers at or near the summit of such
a hierarchy, the protection afforded to them is potentially very significant,
even in the absence of an absolute content-based protection. Where private
papers are sought pursuant to a search warrant, the fourth amendment pro-
cedural requirements of probable cause and specificity should be stringently
applied and the amendment's reasonableness clause should be given indepen-
dent substantive meaning. Where a subpoena directs the production of
private papers, the privacy interests present in private papers should be held
to require a fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry significantly greater
than the current approach of near-total deference to the administrative and
grand jury processes.
'"Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, (1977).
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